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High school sports are routinely segregated based on the sex of the
participants. 1 But forty years ago, the highest court in Massachusetts
ruled in Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Asso
ciation that the state constitution's newly-added equal rights amendment
prohibited the blanket exclusion of boys from girls' athletic teams. 2 In
this way, state constitutional law in Massachusetts departs from Title IX,
as well as that of other states, in providing a legal foundation for a wider
selection of gender-integrated high school sports. Yet, while some mixed
participation does occur on the margins, athletic opportunities in Massa
chusetts do not significantly differ from those in other states, in that most
remain segregated by sex. Sport organizers in Massachusetts have thus
arguably missed an opportunity presented by its unique constitutional law
to provide students in the Commonwealth a more balanced menu of ath
letic opportunities that incorporate both sex-segregated and gender-free
sports for the advantages each uniquely provides. As described more
fully in Part III, gender-free sport can address logistical challenges posed
by segregating boys' and girls' opportunities within the same sport, mit
igate the stereotypes of inferior girls' sports, and maximize inclusion of
transgender athletes. While segregated sport serves an important role as
well-that of protecting and preserving opportunities for female athletes
whose interests and abilities have historically and continuously been sup
pressed-it is time to start thinking not about replacing girls' sports alto
gether but adding more gender-free sports to the mix. Given its permis
sive constitutional law on gender integration in sport, Massachusetts
would be the perfect state to experiment with a more diverse menu of
athletic offerings. At the very least, Massachusetts should identify those
sports in which separation does more harm than good, and test whether
degendering 3 sport provides net advantages. Such experimentation would
serve not only students in Massachusetts, but in other states as well. In
deed, Massachusetts is unique in the degree to which it resists gender
segregation in sport as a matter of constitutional law, but all states are
permitted to favor integration more so than they are. Thus, the example
that Massachusetts would set by embracing its unique constitutional law
is capable of inspiring change throughout the country.
l
See generally MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC Ass'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING ATHLETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR PRINCIPALS AND ATHLETIC DIRECTORS (June 2019),
http://www. miaa. net/genlmiaa_generated_bin/documents/basic_module/MIAA_Hand boo kl 9_21. pdf [https: //perma. cc/6QBA-FZ34] [hereinafter MIAA HANDBOOK).
2 393 N.E.2d 284, 296 (Mass. 1979).
3 For the purposes ofthis article, the author uses the term "degendering" which relates to removing
sex and gender as defining characteristics for separating and classifying sports programs. This term
is written to be specific to this article, inclusive of non-binary people, and suggestive of co-ed athletic
opportunities. This article also uses "gender-free" as shorthand for free from constraints or require
ments based on the participants' sex or gender. Gender-free sports are distinguishable from coed
sports, which do often take the participants' sex into account, whether it be by imposing a minimum
or maximum number of participants of each sex, or otherwise factoring sex into the rules of play.
For example, gender-free softball would not insist that batters alternate by sex, as is common in
coed softball. Unlike mixed double tennis, gender-free tennis would not require that the server and
receiver be of the same sex.
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Part I of this article describes the Supreme Judicial Court's decision
in Attorney General v. MIAA and the influence of the state's equal rights
amendment in its conclusion that boys cannot categorically be excluded
from girls' teams. Part II explains the exceptionalism of Massachusetts
constitutional law in the area of gender segregation in sport by comparing
Attorney General v. MIAA to Title IX and other courts' interpretation of
state constitutional law. Part III suggests that Massachusetts educators
should take inspiration from the Supreme Judicial Court's skepticism of
the protectionist rationale inherent in sex-segregation and create more
gender-free athletic opportunities for high school students in the Com
monwealth, which would serve to challenge negative stereotypes about
female athleticism, equalize access to resources, and enhance opportuni
ties for transgender students. Finally, Part IV applies the skepticism to
the sport of golf in particular and nominates it as a candidate for degen
dering. Degendering golf would create more opportunities for female
golfers to shine against other golfers of all genders, as Emily Nash did
in 2017 when she shot the lowest score at the Central Massachusetts Re
gional Tournament for boys' golf. 4 It would also curtail the practice of
relegating girls' team golf to the suboptimal spring season and provide
more opportunities for students to participate in athletics without regard
to gender. Finally, any adverse impact on girls' participation that could
result from degendering golf could be mitigated by the fact that the rules
of team golf are inherent or fixed. Compared to other sports, the scoring
of team golf could be creatively reirnagined to reward and encourage
participation by more diverse team of athletes who contribute different
skills.

I.

MAsSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON SEX
SEGREGATION IN SPORT

On November 2, 1976, voters in Massachusetts amended the dec
laration of rights in the state's constitution, the oldest in the United States,
to ensure that "equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex .... "5 The political motivation for this amendment came
from the national movement to adopt an Equal Rights Amendment
("ERA") to the U.S. Constitution, which Massachusetts had voted to rat
ify four years earlier. 6 Though the national movement would ultimately
4 Emily Kay, Dumb rule denies high school golfer Emily Nash her trophy because she's a girl,
SBNATION (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www .sbnation.com/golf/2017 /10/26/16554750/emily-nash-mas
sachusetts-high-school-golf-boys-tournament-denied-trophy [https: //perma. cc/TRM2-YRMC].
5 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1, as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. 106 ("Equality under
the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.").
6 Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in
Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1201 n. l (2005)
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fail, Massachusetts's ERA immediately curtailed various sex-based dis
tinctions in such realms as child support, 7 property ownership, 8 and the
criminalization of prostitution. 9 The subject of gender neutrality in public
school athletics, however, proved to be more challenging.
In 1977, a football-coach-turned legislator introduced a bill in the
Massachusetts General Assembly's House of Representatives that would
prohibit girls from participating in the contact sports of football, wres
tling, and ice hockey. 10 The bill survived review by the education com
mittee over the objection of one its members, Representative Ann C.
Gannett. 11 But before the House could vote on the bill (which had been
amended to drop reference to ice hockey), Representative Gannett con
vinced the body to instead certify a question to the Supreme Judicial
Court, seeking an advisory opinion on the bill's constitutionality under
the state ERA. 12 Just over a month later, the Supreme Judicial Court
opined that such a blanket prohibition on girls' participation in certain
sports would be unconstitutional. 13 The Court had already concluded in
earlier cases that the ERA requires the court to review sex-based classi
fications by the state with strict scrutiny and accordingly found no com
pelling state interest in a ban that would categorically prohibit girls from
football and wrestling. 14 It also pointed out that courts routinely strike
down policies excluding girls from boys' sports under the U.S. Consti
tution's equal protection clause, which uses a lower level of scrutiny than
the Massachusetts ERA requires. 15 As a result of the opinion, the legis
lature dropped consideration of the bill.

Meanwhile, the state's interscholastic athletic association, the Mas
sachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association (MIAA), was struggling
to conform its rules to the ERA as well. 16 Though the MIAA had long
(explaining that Massachusetts was among the first fourteen states to enshrine equality of the sexes
in their constitutions).
7 Commonwealth. v. MacKenzie, 334 N.E.2d 613, 616--19 (1975).
8 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 1 (1979) (permitting both spouses a unilateral right to convey
property held as tenancy by the entirety).
9 Commonwealth. v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 207 (Mass. 1977).
10 An Act Relative to the Regulations for Participation in School Athletic Programs, House No.
4078, 1977.
11 Representative Gannett, a Republican from Wayland, was only the 35th woman ever elected to
the General Assembly. See Massachusetts Women's Caucus, History of Women in Massachusetts
Government (June 13, 2018), http://www. mawomenscaucus. com/history-of-women-in-massachu
setts-government/; see, e.g., Letter from Ann. C. Gannett to President Gerald R Ford, (Sept. 9,
1974), https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/pardon/005601018-010.pdf (criticiz
ing the decision of President Ford-a fellow Republican-to pardon Richard Nixon: "It sickens me
to even think that this was the plan all along.").
12 MASS. LEGISLATIVE RECORD (Nov. 21, 1977) House No. 6786 (statement of Rep. Gannett).
13 Op. of the Justices to the H.R., 371 N.E.2d 426, 430 (Mass. 1977).
14 Id. at 429-430.
15 Id.
16 Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 287 ("By 1976, evidently reflecting regu
lations promulgated by the State Board of Education, and, more generally, the adoption of ERA in
that year, [the MIAA Rules and Regulations Governing Athletics] had been amended so that a student
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prohibited girls and boys from ever participating on the same teams, it
amended this rule to permit both girls and boys to participate on teams
designated for the other sex, unless the school provided a "separate but
equal" team in that sport. 17 Consistent with the new rule, one Massachu
setts high school permitted boys to play on its girls' softball team, given
the absence of a separate softball team for boys. 18 This prompted protest
and litigation, which effectively pressured the MIAA to amend the rule
once again. 19 While retaining the right of girls to try out for boys' team
in the absence of a girls' team in their sport, the new rule excluded boys
from playing on all girls' teams. 20 When the MIAA denied waivers to
Massachusetts high schools so that their male students could continue to
play on girls' teams in a variety of sports, like volleyball, field hockey,
and swimming, litigation against the MIAA again ensued, giving the Su
preme Judicial Court another opportunity to apply the state's new ERA
to high school athletics. 21

In Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Asso
ciation, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that it was unconstitutional
to categorically ban boys from girls' teams. 22 Though the Court implicitly
accepted the rule's apparent objectives-ensuring competitive fairness,
promoting safety, and preserving athletic opportunities for girls-a com
pelling justification was, and is today, not enough to survive the scrutiny
of sex-based classifications that the ERA requires. 23 The state must also
use narrowly-tailored means that inflict the least discrimination possi
ble.24 MIAA's arguments in support of the rule, however, were "replete
with stereotypical assumptions and generalities" about the weakness and
fragility of female athletes. 25 While competitive fairness and safety are
achieved by grouping athletes by functional ability, the Court reasoned,
sex is an imperfect proxy for function, 26 even if "biological circum
stances" confer a competitive advantage on boys in general. 27 The Court
reasoned:
The general male athletic superiority based on physical fea
tures is challenged by the development in increasing numbers
of female athletes whose abilities exceed those of most men,
could not be barred from competing for a place on a team because of sex unless the school provided
a 'separate but equal' team.").
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
W[d.
21

Id.
Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
21 Id.
26 Id.
21 Id.
22

at 288.
at 296.
at 291.
at 294.
at 293.
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and in some cases approach those of the most talented men.
Coordination, concentration, strategic acumen, and technique
or form (capabilities of both sexes) intermix with strength and
speed (where males have some biologic advantages) to pro
duce athletic results. Classification on strict grounds of sex,
without reference to actual skill differentials in particular
sports, would merely echo "archaic and overbroad generaliza
tions. "28
The MIAA' s final argument was that the rule was necessary to pro
tect girls from being edged out of their own teams as they became
"swamped" with male players. 29 But the Court was unwilling to credit
the speculation that female athletes were categorically vulnerable to dis
placement by more athletic boys. 30 Perhaps especially in female-dominant
sports, the court reasoned that female athletes will generally hold on to
their spots by virtue of their athletic talent. 31 The Court singled out gym
nastics, swimming, and riflery as sports where it assumed boys were
unlikely to have a competitive advantage. 32 Moreover, if permitting
crossover tryouts for boys did in fact prove over time to reduce the num
ber of athletic opportunities for girls, there are other less discriminatory
means to address the problem. For example, the Court suggested the
MIAA could cap the number of boys who could play on a girls' team or
restrict participation to boys whose height, weight, and skill were within
the range of their female competition. 33 The Court even suggested that
"[a]drnission could perhaps be regulated by handicapping in a sport like
golf. "34 Additionally, the Court emphasized that a separate boys team
could always be a "backstop" to these alternatives: "if enough boys are
interested in a sport to try out for, and threaten to oust girl players from
a particular team, the school authorities are on notice that a boys' team
may be in order. "35
II.

MAsSACHUSETfS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT

To understand the uniqueness of Massachusetts constitutional law
on gender and sports, it is necessary to consider the legal context of sex
segregated athletics, then and now. First, the Court's advisory opinion
on crossover participation by girls is not revolutionary, but it's largely
28

Id.
Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
'34 Id.
35 Id.
29

(citation omitted).
at 294.
at 294-95.
at 295.
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consistent with the mainstream of cases decided under federal and other
states' constitutional law. 36 Neither is the fact that the Court offered no
objection-not in its advisory opinion on the crossover participation
rights of girls, nor in its decision in Attorney General v. MIAA securing
a limited crossover participation right of boys-to the practice of segre
gating athletes by sex in the first place. 37 But the Court's decision in
Attorney General v. MIAA, its refusal to engage in generalizations and
stereotypes about inferior female athleticism, and its imagining of crea
tive possibilities for integration provides a roadmap to some experimen
tation with gender-free sport-an opportunity that the MIAA and its
member schools have never pursued. 38

A. "Separate but Equal" is the Default Rule in Sport
Massachusetts is not unique in endorsing the default principle that
athletics may permissibly be segregated by sex. 39 The pervasiveness and
entrenchment of the separate-but-equal approach to sex equity in athletics
is largely attributable to Title IX, the federal law passed in 1972 to pro
hibit sex discrimination in education. 40 The statute itself is silent with
regard to its application to collegiate and scholastic athletics, but its im
plementing regulations, 41 enforced by the Department of Education's Of
fice for Civil Rights, supply additional detail. Though these regulations
do not require educational institutions to offer separate male and female
athletics programs, they do permit, and thereby and normalize, them. 42
36 See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (Wash. 1975) ("The WIAA rule forbidding
qualified girls from playing on the high school football team in interscholastic competition cannot
be used to deny the [appellants], and girls like them, the right to participate as members of that
team."); Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing Minnesota
high school rule that disallowed females from playing on male teams); Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding that prohibition on females
competing on male teams to be Equal Protection Clause violation).
37
See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n., 647 F.2d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 1981) ("To hold that a recipient of federal ald may let girls at
the middle school level compete on the same team with boys, if this furthers the goal of equal athletic
opportunity, is not to hold that all teams must be coeducational at all levels .... ").
38 Mass. Imerscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 295. ("[T]he rule overlooks approaches ..
. that could solve any anticipated problem of boys in substantial numbers displacing girls from
competition.... Use of standards focusing on height, weight, or skill rather than solely on gender
represents one such approach .... ").
39 See discussion infra subparts II(B), Il(C). Courts outside of Massachusetts have justified per
missible sex-segregated sports on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.
Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) Gustifying ruling against female soccer players based on discretion of
schools); Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) Gustifying
exclusion of female from a high school boys' basketball team based on physical differences between
the sexes).
40 See 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (2012) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . ").
41 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2018).
42 Id. § 106.41(b) ("[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each
sex .... ").
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Permission to operate sex- segregated athletics programs extends broadly
to those teams for which "[the] selection ... is based upon competitive
skill or the activity involved is a contact sport, "43 which is to say, any
sport with a tryout process (including interscholastic and intercollegiate
programs) as well as teams that are open to all-comers if the sport in
question is a contact sport. 44 The regulations and associated policies nor
malize sex-segregation by devoting the majority of their focus to the re
quirements for equitable treatment of the separate programs45 and by lim
iting the right of girls to play with boys and vice versa (so called
"crossover participation") to a narrow range of circumstances, discussed
in the next subpart. Title IX and its associated regulations and policies
have tremendous effect on cultural norms, as well as institutional behav
ior. 46 While prior to Title IX some educational institutions had experi
mented with gender-free athletic opportunities, today nearly all interscho
lastic or intercollegiate sports are designated male or female. In the
1970s, some women's sports advocates argued for integrated athletic op
portunities, 47 a position that is rarely taken today.
It is interesting that "separate-but-equal" justifications for gender
and sport are accepted today, given that Title IX and equal protection
doctrine apply formal equality mandates to other contexts, like admis
sions and employment. The adoption and endurance of the separate-but
equal justification reflect generalizations and stereotypes about female
athleticism, to be sure. But it also reflects a pragmatic concern that sep
arate opportunities for women and girls were necessary to overcome a
history of women's exclusion from sport, and the resulting suppression
of their athletic interests and abilities. 48 Even Massachusetts, with the
broadest rights to crossover participation of any state, does not challenge
the practice of segregating high school sports by sex as a general rule.
In Attorney General v. MIAA, the Supreme Judicial Court at least implic
itly acknowledged that preserving opportunities for previously under
served girls is a compelling state interest. 49 This interest is served by the
'separate but equal' approach but is only constitutional if it minimizes
sex-based exclusions to the greatest extent possible. Thus, in ruling that
43
44

45

Id.
Id.

See id. § 106 .41 (c) ; 1979 Policy Interpretation; 1996 Clarification.
Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Spon and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 18 (2001) ("In short, opportunities for female athletes are at an all-time
high, and public interest in and support for women's sports has never been greater. The changes in
women's sports participation have been accompanied by significant cultural change . . . . Title IX
has played a large, if unquantifiable role in this cultural shift and the new opportunities that made it
possible.").
47
EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE IS NOT
EQUAL IN SPORTS 213-14 (2008).
48 See generally DEBORAH BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN'S SPORTS
REVOLUTION 15-39 (2010) (describing several justifications for separate-but-equal gender opportu
nities in sports).
49 See Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 295 (having discussed the criteria for
sex-based classifications to survive judicial review, the court nonetheless felt the need to state that
"the legality of separate but equal teams is not challenged here.").
46
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some crossover participation be allowed, the Court is not contradicting
sex-segregated athletics, but is instead creating the conditions by which
it is possible to uphold the practice as a general rule.
B. Girls on Boys' Teams: A (Limited) Exception to the Rule
Massachusetts is also not unique in endorsing the right of girls to
try out for boys' teams. 50 Title IX and equal protection doctrine both
support at least a limited right of crossover participation by girls. Title
IX's regulatory provision governing crossover participation mandates
that an athlete be permitted to try out for a team of the other sex when
the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the school already offers
a team in that sport to members of the sex opposite to that of the athlete, 51
(2) "opportunities in that athlete's sex have previously been limited, "52
and (3) the sport in question is not a contact sport. 53 This statutory man
date for permitting crossover participation has brought more athletic op
portunities for females: though athletic opportunities for high school girls
has increased more than 10-fold since the 1970s, the share of athletic
opportunities allocated to girls has never been higher than 44.5 %.54 It is
likely that at nearly all coed high schools, girls' athletic opportunities
have previously been limited, and even continue to be so. Therefore, a
girl at a school with only a boys' golf team, for example, would have the
same opportunity as boys to pursue a position on the team.
Due to the regulatory exception for contact sports, however, that
girl would not have a right under Title IX to try out for the school's only
football team. 55 But courts applying the equal protection doctrine have
been less willing to endorse the contact sports limitation, and have rec
ognized the right of girls to try out for boys' teams in both contact and

~See, e.g., Darrin, 540 P.2d at 893 ("The WIAA rule forbidding qualified girls from playing
on the high school football team in interscholastic competition cannot be used to deny the [appel
lants], and girls like them, the right to participate as members of that team.").
51 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(b) (2018).
52 Id. Some have argued that the "historically limited" be interpreted to permit boys' right to a
crossover tryout in sports where their opportunities are historically limited. See Gomes v. Rhode
Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 665-66 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d
733 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Adam S. Darowski, For Kenny Who Wanted to Play Women's Field
Hockey, 12 Dmrn J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 153, 162 (2005).
53 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2018) (noting contact sports are defined in the regulations as "boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.").
54
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HIGH SCHOOLS, Participation Statistics 2016-17,
http://www. nfhs. org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF/2016-17 _Participation_Survey_Results. pdf (not
ing the percentage of athletic opportunities available to women in 2016-2017).
55 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2018) ("[A) recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for mem
bers of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity in
volved is a contact sport.").
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noncontact sports. 56 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opined
that a rule banning girls from the contact sports of wrestling and football
would never survive the strict scrutiny that Massachusetts applies to dis
tinctions based on sex. 57 Similarly, courts applying intermediate scrutiny
have rejected attempts to exclude girls from boys' teams based on gener
alizations about inferior female athleticism and diminished size and
strength on the grounds that those justifications are inconsistently ap
plied. 58
On the other hand, courts have found that equal protection doctrine
mirrors Title IX' s restriction of female crossover participation to sports
in which there is an available girls' team. For example, the Seventh Cir
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that an exceptionally talented female basket
ball player named Karen 0' Connor did not have a constitutional right to
try out for a boys' basketball team because the school sponsored a sepa
rate girls team in that sport. 59 The court's decision, along with Justice
Stevens's single-Justice opinion on appeal from a ruling involving pre
liminary relief,6() confirmed that the law sublimated O'Connor's individ
ual right to an opportunity suited to her talents to the broader interest in
order to protect female athletic opportunities through the separate-but
equal approach. 61 This distinction was necessary, as Justice Stevens put
it, to address the "substantial risk that boys would dominate the girls'
programs and deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscho
lastic events. "62 This limitation is designed to protect the rights of female
athletes as a group. 63 Women's separate athletic programs offer female
56 See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (wrestling); Force v.
Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031-32 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (football). See also B.
Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty: Ending Sex Segregation in School Spons, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1125
(2002). The tendency of some courts to affirm female athletes' equal protection right to participate
on boys' teams in contact sports (absent a girl team in that sport) neutralizes Title IX's contact sports
exemption where state-sponsored athletic programs are concerned in those jurisdictions. See Su
zanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Spons Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights
Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381 (2000); George, supra at 1127 (pointing out that courts have not
enjoined the contact sports exemption itself because it merely permits, not requires, conduct that
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
57
See supra Part I.
58 Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1500 (noting that the state's rules do not require girls to lift 200 pounds
to wrestle, while in some instances men must, though boys are not required to do so in this case).
59 O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1981).
00 See generally O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980). The Court of Appeals stayed
the preliminary injunction that O'Connor had obtained from the district court. O'Connor petitioned
the Supreme Court to vacate the stay, which Justice Stevens denied in his capacity as Circuit Justice.
Id. at 1301. This decision remains the closest the Supreme Court has ever gotten to addressing the
legality of sex segregation in athletics.
61 O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1307; see also O'Connor, 645 F.2d at 581-82 (quoting Justice Stevens
and making the same point).
62 O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1307.
63 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(c) (2018) (stating the criteria for equal opportunity in terms of provi
sions for "members of" groups, not individuals); Courtney W. Howland, Sex Discrimination and
Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L. J. 1254, 1265 (1979) ("The
development of the woman athlete thus requires equality of participation in group athletics. Although
equality on an individual basis might simply demand sex-blind sports teams, equality on a group
basis demands more.").
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athletes the opportunity to compete that they might not have if athletic
opportunities were distributed solely on the basis of talent and interest,
since the historic exclusion of girls and women from sport suppressed
their interests and talents in athletics in the first place. This objective is
arguably incompatible with strong protection for individual talented fe
male athletes to engage in crossover participation, for two reasons. First,
schools might be deterred from adding girls' teams in the first place if
not for the fact that doing so creates a legal and socially acceptable way
to prevent girls from trying out for boys' teams. Second, a broad right
to crossover participation could undermine girls' sports by permitting the
most talented girls to bypass rather than establish them as a legitimate
purveyor of interest and talent.
In Massachusetts as well, girls' right to part1c1pation on boys'
teams-as well as the reciprocal right of boys, discussed below-is lim
ited to those athletes for whom the school does not provide a team in that
sport to members of the athlete's sex. 64 Courts in Massachusetts have
never had the opportunity to address the compatibility of this limitation
with the state ERA.

C. Boys on Girls' Teams: Almost Never
Massachusetts law is unique in recognizing a right of boys to try
out for girls' teams. 65 Until recently, the MIAA rule implementing the
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Attorney General v. MIAA read, "A
girl may play on a boys' team if that sport is not offered in the school for
the girl, and a boy may play on a girls' team if that sport is not offered
in the school for the boy. "66 Recent revisions to the MIAA handbook
confirmed that this right can be limited in situations where necessary to
preserve opportunities for girls in the interest of Title IX compliance67 
a clarification likely responsive to pressure resulting from complaints to
the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (hereafter
"OCR")68 that the application of MIAA's rule permitting boys on girls'
64 MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 42. Rule 43.2 and 43.3 of the MIAA's Rules and Regula
tions Governing Athletes state:
43.2.If a school offers a single team in a particular sport, it may not restrict eligibility based on
gender unless such a restriction is necessary to ensure that the school's gendered designation of
athletic opportunities complies with Title IX (either by demonstrating proportionality or the absence
of unmet interest among members of the underrepresented sex).
43.3.If a school offers a girls' team and a boys' team in a particular sport (including offering the
same sport in two different seasons), it may restrict eligibility based on gender.
Id. The language permitting schools to exclude boys from girls' teams if necessary for Title IX
compliance went into effect in 2019. Id. at 4.
65 Id. at 4, 42.
66 Id. at 4.
67 Id. at 4, 42.
68 Bob Holmes, MIAA receives complaint over boys playing field hockey, Bos. GLOBE (Sept. 28,
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field hockey teams deprives girls of opportunities in violation of Title IX.
Considering the three alternative routes that schools may take to demon
strate compliance in their distribution of athletic opportunities by sex, a
school would only be permitted to exclude a boy from the only team in
the sport if (1) girls are underrepresented in athletic opportunities (viola
tion of the first test), (2) there is no history and continuing practice of
adding opportunities for girls (violation of the second test), and (3) the
presence of a boy on the team displaces a girl from the team who other
wise would have qualified for the team (and therefore constitutes "unmet
interest" in violation of the third compliance test). 69 At schools where the
first or second tests are satisfied, or where the team in question does not
cut players, boys still have the right to try out for girls' teams. 70
Even with the recent qualification for Title IX compliance, boys'
rights to participate on girls' teams in sports for which no boys' teams
exist is still broader than under Title IX. Title IX, in contrast, limits
crossover participation to athletes for whom athletic opportunities have
"previously been limited .... "71 Though commentators have discussed
a sport-specific interpretation of this requirement that would give boys
an opportunity to try out for sports that have been historically limited to
girls, 72 only one federal court has ever endorsed this position, in a pre
liminary injunction analysis that was later vacated as moot. 73 Instead, the
prevailing view seems to be that the regulation requires the participants'
athletic opportunities in general to have been historically limited at the
participants' schools. 74 As noted above, this interpretation will rarely if
ever apply to boys. Even if a boy did successfully manage to mount this
hurdle, he would still only have the right to participate in non-contact
sports in which his school did not sponsor a boys' team.
Boys outside of Massachusetts have also had relatively little success
using equal protection doctrine to secure their right to play on girls'
teams. 75 Courts applying intermediate scrutiny required by the
2012),
https://www.boston.com/sports/untagged/2012/09/28/miaa-receives-us-complaint-over
boys-playing-field-hockey [https://perma.cc/2Z33-WDAT]; see also Christopher Marquis, An

Equal Playing Field: The Potential Conflict Between Title IX & the Massachusetts Equal Rights
Amendment, 34 B.C.J.L. & Soc. JUST. 77, 79 (2014) (describing the complaint issued by the Office
of Civil Rights to the MIAA).
(f) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercol
legiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
70 Id.
71 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(b) (2018).
72 Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D.R. I. 1991); Da
rowski, supra note 52, at 162-65; Sangree, supra note 56, at 390 ("However, with respect to all
female teams, the majority of courts have declined to order that males be allowed to try out because
they cannot establish a history of exclusion from sports opportunities.").
73 Gomes, 469 F. Supp. at 664-66.
74 Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993); Mularadelis v.
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
75 Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1982); Kleczek v. R.I.
Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D.R.I. 1991); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., Cumberland
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Fourteenth Amendment have generally reasoned that redressing past dis
crimination against girls is an important objective and that the categorical
exclusion of boys from girls' teams suitably serves this objective by pro
tecting existing opportunities from displacement by more athletic boys. 76
Courts considering state constitutional claims have reached similar con
clusions, 77 even in states that, like Massachusetts, apply strict scrutiny of
sex-based designations. 78 Thus, the rights of girls as a group to have sep
arate athletic opportunities is elevated above both the rights of individual
girls who may be better served by the boys' team and of individual boys
to play sports only offered to girls. 79
However, there is one notable exception of a recent decision apply
ing equal protection principles in boys' favor. In March 2019, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a preliminary injunction against the
Minnesota state interscholastic athletic association's rule that prohibited
boys from participating on competitive dance teams. 80 The court reasoned
that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on the merits because
statewide participation data showed very similar rates of athletic partici
pation by boys and girls, 81 calling into question the persuasiveness of the
association's justification for treating students differently on the basis of
sex. 82 Subsequent to the decision, the association changed the rule after
settling the case, 83 though it is still too soon to tell whether this case is an
outlier rooted in potentially unique facts of Minnesota's equitable partic
ipation data or the beginning of a shift in favor of integrating former
girls' sports.
Unless or until such shift occurs, the Supreme Judicial Court's
Reg'! Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (addressing only state
claims, as it is not a federal court); Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (citing People v. Ellis, 311N.E.2d98 (Ill. 1974)).
76 Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56.
77 Klezcek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56; B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d at 1065-66 (addressing only
state claims, as it is not a federal court).
78 Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 858-59 (citing People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (lll. 1974)).
79 Parenthetically, one issue that seems to be underexamined by all courts considering equal pro
tection or Title IX claims by boys is that the concern about boys swamping girls' teams has an outer
limit in Title IX. Even if boys did in fact displace girls from opportunities that they had previously
enjoyed, Title IX would operate in many such cases to require schools to replace those opportunities
since an equitable distribution of athletic opportunities is still required in those circumstances. A
school whose girls' volleyball team has been displaced by boys, for example, would be legally
compelled to add another girls' volleyball team to ensure that the overall distribution of athletic
opportunities remains proportionate to the gender breakdown of the student body. That school might
also need to eliminate a boys' team as well to attain proportionality, since the original girls' volley
ball team itself probably existed to balance out some other boys' team. But the result might be
athletic opportunities more aligned with the actual interest of boys who just (in this hypothetical)
wanted to play volleyball so badly that they took over the girls' team.
m D.M. v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 917 F.3d 994, 1004 (8th Cir. 2019).
81 ld. at 1001 (stating that data for 2017-18 showed boys were actually the underrepresented sex
by 0.35 percentage points).
82 ld. at 1002.
83 Settlement Allows Minnesota Buys to Dance Competitively, AP NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www .apnews.corn/ff8c2ld045aa4ec18996321021ef7laf [https://perma.cc/ZQP5-9QS4].
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ruling in Attorney General v. MIAA that the state athletic association's
rule banning boys from girls' teams violated the state constitution's Equal
Rights Amendment remains unique. Other courts assume that recogniz
ing boys' rights to crossover participation would threaten girls' opportu
nities because girls would not be able to hold on to them in an open
tryout. 84 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pushes back against
this narrative with concern for the generalization it embodies. 85
In acknowledging the potential for girls to hold to their own against
boys, or at least its rejection that the concern of protecting girls' oppor
tunities requires such a blunt tool as boys' categorical exclusion, the Su
preme Judicial Court did more than acknowledge the legal right of a
handful of boys who are so devoted to sports like field hockey, volley
ball, or swimming, that they are willing to try out for a girls' team. Its
pushback against the protectionism rationale for segregation also pro
vides legal support for athletic opportunities that are organized without
regard to athletes' gender, especially where such gender-free opportuni
ties are included in a menu of diverse athletic offerings, some of which
are segregated and some of which are not. While it invited consideration
of other integration techniques like height- weight- and skill-based clas
sifications, or gender-neutral systems of "handicapping, "86 the Supreme
Judicial Court also acknowledged that some sports might be more suita
ble for integration than others. 87 Yet the MIAA' s response to the Su
preme Judicial Court's decision was to remove the blanket restriction on
boys' participation on girls' teams, allowing students of either sex to try
out for the cross-sex team if that is the only team in their sport. 88 It has
never seriously accepted the Supreme Judicial Court's invitation or
roadmap for progressing beyond minimal compliance with its decision
and imagining more integrated possibilities for high school sports.

84

See Williams, 998 F.2d at 172-76.
Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 290 ("[E]ven if equal rights provisions
could be viewed primarily as a means of eradicating discrimination against women, they tend to
protect men as well, because disadvantages suffered by males are often premised on a "romantic
paternalism" stigmatizing to women.").
86
Id. at 295.
87 Id. at 295 ("The defendants offer ... a connection between the presence of male athletes on a
team with injury to females. It is replete with stereotypical assumptions and generalities .... But if
we were to indulge an assumption of such a relationship in the rougher sports, what of golf, gym
nastics, riflery, skiing, track, cross-country running, swimming, tennis? Risks are not constant."
(Citations omitted)).
88 MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 42. Rule 43.1 of the MIAA's Rules and Regulations Gov
erning Athletes states:
No student shall be denied in any implied or explicit manner the opportunity to participate in any
interscholastic activity because of gender. A school may establish separate teams for males and
females for interscholastic competition in a sport provided that both teams receive equal instruction,
training, coaching, access to available facilities, equipment, opportunities to practice and compete.
Id.
85
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BENEFITS OF GENDER-FREE ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION

Despite the Attorney General v. MIAA court's refusal to accept the
categorization of all girls as athletically inferior, Massachusetts still or
ganizes sports with protectionism in mind. 89 Few boys participate on
girls' teams in team sports that have traditionally been female; field
hockey is the notable example. 90 And when boys participate in girls'
teams in individual sports, they have in the past been subject to a rule (as
were girls who play on boys' teams) that redirects them into post-season
tournaments that correspond to their own sex. 91
While retaining segregated opportunities in many or even most
sports probably makes sense, it is notable that even with the state consti
tution's more permissive approach to boys and girls playing together,
there have been few-if any-efforts to combine once-segregated oppor
tunities for girls and boys into sports organized without regard to gender.
Instead, opportunities for gender-free participation are as rare in Massa
chusetts as in any other state notwithstanding the benefits to students that
would come from having at least some gender-free opportunities to
choose from. This is a missed opportunity to pursue the benefits of gen
der-free participation. In particular, as addressed in this part, those ben
efits are: reducing stigma, ensuring equal treatment, and maximizing in
clusion of transgender athletes.

A. Segregation and Stigma
Segregation stigmatizes women's sports and its participants by per
petuating the belief that female athletes require that a remedial vt!rsion of
sport must exist to accommodate them. But of course, it is possible for
female athletes to be competitive and successful when they compete with
and against male athletes. For example, in October 2017, a female golfer
named Emily Nash-mentioned in the introduction of this Article-shot
the lowest score at the Central Massachusetts boys' regional champion
ship. 92 Yet, public perception of Nash's talent would have been different
89

See Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 288.
Marquis, supra note 68, at 85 (describing field hockey examples).
91 See MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
ATHLETICS A HANDBOOK FOR PRINCIPALS AND ATHLETIC DIRECTORS 42 (revised Oct. 3, 2018),
http://www.miaa.net/gen/miaa_generated_bin/documents/basic_module/MIAAHandbookl 719. pdf
[https://perma.cc/AMG8-47SZ] [hereinafter MIAA HANDBOOK 2017-2019]. Rule 43.2.1.2 of the
MIAA's former Rules and Regulations Governing Athletes states:
Students from mixed gender regular season teams will participate in the regional and state tour
naments of their own gender in the sports of cross country, indoor track, outdoor track, skiing,
swimming and diving, and individual tennis.
Id.
92 Kay, supra note 4.
90
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if her high school had made the choice to sponsor a girls team. If it had,
she would have competed in the girls' regular season and the girls' post
season tournament in the spring, where her victory (if she had won)
would have been unremarkable. Individual examples like Nash are con
sistent with evidence of the tendency for women to outperform men in
certain sports, and that they are closing the performance gap in others. 93
In a world with more opportunities for gender-free sport, it will be easier
to recognize female athleticism as just plain athleticism.
Not only would integration of sports provide more opportunities to
contextualize female athleticism, it is also possible that it would permit
exploration of the possibility that segregation itself is contributing to
differences in performance by perpetuating self-fulfilling gender stereo
types. Segregation sends the message that "women are physically
weaker" or that they "will be badly beaten and emotionally crushed" if
they participate alongside men. 94 These stereotypes themselves may af
fect the athletic performance of female athletes who internalize them.
Indeed, sport scholars have shown that the concept of stereotype inter
nalization operates in the context of athletics. 95
Some coed athletic opportunities continue to perpetuate perfor
mance-affecting stereotypes with protectionist, sex-specific rules. For ex
ample, some coed sports have rules that take the sex of the player into
account, whether by setting a minimum number of female players that
can be on the field or imposing other sex-specific rules. 96 In high school
sports, a common example of coed sports is mixed double tennis, which
requires that participating teams consist of one female and one male
player. 'Tl In similar fashion, some high school athletic associations en
dorse coed golf that is played by pairs consisting of one male and one
MCDONAGH & PAPPANO, supra note 47, at 58-63.
Id. at 15; see also Suzanne Eckes & Stephanie D. McCall, Channeling Billy Elliott: Legal
Issues and Outmoded Stereotypes in Athletics, 366 ED. LAW REP. 578, 583 (2019) (arguing that the
challenge to integrate Minnesota high school dance teams "could have been figured as a site for
insisting on girls' strengths and boys would be 'allowed' to dance with them" but instead served to
"us[e] sports to construct essentialized beliefs about gender differences.").
95 One study noted that "there are two main pathways in which sex stereotypes manifest in sporting
contexts. First, as long as it is known by the individual, a stereotype can operate directly and affect
his/her performance if it is activated in a valued situation. Stereotypes can also operate indirectly,
through an internalization process." Julie Boich ... et al., Development of Sex Stereotypes Relative
to Sport Competence and Value During Adolescence, 15 PSYCHOL. OF SPORT & EXERCISE 212, 212
(2014) (citations omitted).
96 See Adam Cohen et al., Investigating a Coed Sport's Ability to Encourage Inclusion and Equal
ity, 28 J. SPORT MGMT. 220 (2014) (noting such examples of coed football rules that require a female
player to catch or pass the ball once every four downs, and coed softball rules that allow a male
batter to take two bases instead of one if he is walked on four pitches); see also Catherine LeClair,
Why Co-Ed Sports Leagues Are Never Really Co-Ed, DEADSPIN (July 25, 2018), https://dead
spin. com/why-co-ed-sports-leagues-are-never-really-co-ed-1827699592 [https: / /perma. cc/DE3L
DJQ8].
97
MIAA, Individual Tennis Format Sport Specific Information at 3, available at
http://www.miaa.net/ gen/miaa_generated_bin/documents/basic_module/tennisindividual20 l 9for
mat. pdf [https: //perma.cc/G2N3-FfX8].
93

94
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female player. 98 While coed sports structured this way avoid some of the
ways that segregation replicates stereotypes (like the unequal resources
problem discussed above), they still send the message that a team with
more females than another team is inherently disadvantaged. Other coed
sports have sex-specific rules that reinforce the assumption that female
players can't hold their own on the field, such as coed a flag football rule
that a female must catch or pass the ball every four downs, or coed soft
ball that requires the batter order to alternate by sex and that penalizes a
team that walks a male batter by letting him take two bases instead of the
traditional one (the assumption being that the next female in the batting
order is more easily struck out). 99 Additionally, some coed sports (soft
ball, for example) are structured in ways that marginalize female players
into the less critical positions and allow male athletes to usurp them (such
as rules forbidding outfielders from coming in too close when females
are at bat). 100
Gender-free sport reduces the role of stereotype threat by validating
female athleticism from the start. Removing segregation signals confi
dence in the ability of female athletes to hold their own, both by convey
ing the attitude that girls do not need to be protected from boys, and by
dismantling girls-sport-specific rules that convey the message that female
athletes are inferior, such as rules that allow shorter courses of play for
females in golf, 101 and "different rules for checking, hitting, and other
movements" for women's hockey teams. 102 The opportunity for boys and
girls to compete together can give boys the opportunity to appreciate and
respect girls' abilities. 103 Sport scholars have applied intergroup contact
theory to athletic participation and found evidence that diversity among
teams breaks down stereotypes about race, sexual orientation, and even
sex. 104 In the sports that inspire lifelong participation, integration could
have positive ramifications for gender equality far beyond high school
athletics. For example, recreational golf is an important social lubricant
for professional relationships that can serve as a source of business, men
toring, referrals, and information. 105 Country clubs where recreational
golf is played have historically excluded women as a result of its
98 See, e.g., Coed Golf Regulations, IOWA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC UNION (May 22,
2018), https://ighsau.org/news/co-ed-golf-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/W2JM-WVN3].
99 Cohen et al., supra note 96, at 222.
loo Id.
io1 Id.
102 Nancy Leong, Against Women's Sports, 95 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249, 1275-76 (2018) (describ
ing how the different rules for men's and women's sports perpetuate the stereotype of inferior female
athleticism as well as other gender stereotypes).
103 Michael A. Messner & Nancy M. Solomon, Social Justice and Men's Interests: The Case of
Title IX, 31 J. OF SPORT AND Soc. ISSUES 162, 177 (2007).
104 Cohen et al., supra note 96, at 223-224, 232 (describing applications of contact theory to
sport); Id. at 232 (finding that the gender-free sport of quidditch promoted positive stereotypes about
female athleticism).
1
~ MARCIA CHAMBERS, THE UNPLAYABLE LIE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WOMEN AND
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN GOLF 5 (1995).
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emphasis on male corporate culture. 106 And while such policies are rare
today, pervasive negative stereotypes about female golfers still under
mine their opportunities to participate. 107 Men whose high school team
mates were female will be less likely to support and perpetuate these
formal and informal barriers. 108 They will be less likely to assume that a
female colleague doesn't golf or doesn't golf well, and thus more inclined
to extend an invitation to participate, thereby increasing her opportunities
to cultivate relationships that lead to professional advancement and
power.
The argument that educators should take seriously the risk of stigma
that is unnecessarily perpetuated when we fail to narrowly tailor segre
gation to its protectionist purpose is aided by judicial precedent as well.
Courts applying the equal protection doctrine have, in other contexts be
sides athletics, struck down "separate but equal" based on the stigma
inherent in separation. 109 Most notably, the stigma inherent in separation
led the Supreme Court to rule in Brown v. Board of Education that seg
regating schools by race-"even though the physical facilities and other
'tangible' factors may be equal"-violated equal protectionY 0 Segrega
tion "generates a feeling of inferiority" that detrimentally impairs the ed
ucational opportunities of those being excluded. 111 The Court also rec
ognized segregation's tendency to enforce inferiority when it ruled that
Virginia could not defend the exclusion of women from its state military
college by creating a separate leadership program for women. 112 Because
the Court's analysis included other tangible differences between the pro
gram, the inherent inequality of segregation was not conclusive in this
case as it was in Brown. 113 Nevertheless, the Court's decision-best
known for its clear admonition against sex classifications based on
106 See Id. (noting that the "culture of the golf club world has always been heavily dominated by
the males who are leaders in corporate and community life and who often assume leadership roles
in their local country clubs as well.").
107
One such pervasive, negative stereotype is that women play more slowly because they do not
drive as far. Yet because distance does not necessarily equal accuracy, the basis of this stereotype
is questionable.
108 See Cohen et al., supra note 96, at 221-24.
109 Brown v. Bd. of&!. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [black students] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("Over the years, this Court has consist
ently repudiated '(d)istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" (Citations omitted));
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) ("By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.").
110 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
111 Id. at 494.
112 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 (1996).
113 Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9 J. OF
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 336 (1998) ("In the same way that Brown incorporated an evaluation
of inferiority, so also VMI incorporates an evaluation. But whether there is inferiority asserted is
not necessarily conclusive. We know that inferiority is not conclusive because VMI begins by stating
that inferiority is asserted, but the Court goes on with a very lengthy evaluation of other tangible and
intangible factors.").
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"overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or pref
erences of males and females" 114 is rooted in the concern that such gen
eralizations and stereotypes contribute to the "denigration" 115 of the ex
cluded sex. u 6
Yet in sports cases, concerns for denigration or stigma, when in
cluded in the courts' analyses, have played a more limited role. Still,
courts have ruled against unequal treatment of girls' teams after recog
nizing the stigmatizing potential of tangible disparities. 117 For example,
the Michigan High School Athletic Association violated Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause by scheduling six girls' sports in the nontradi
tional season, including girls' basketball, which it scheduled in the fall
instead of the traditional winter season. 118 The district court found that
girls were disadvantaged in such tangible ways as difficulty obtaining in
season equipment, diminished opportunities for national recognition and
honors, and exclusion from promotional events and tournament opportu
nities that are scheduled with traditional-season athletes in mind. u 9 Ad
ditionally, however, the court recognized the psychological impact of the
scheduling decision. 12°For example, depriving female basketball players
of the opportunity to play their sport when the rest of the state and the
nation is participating in or enjoying scholastic and collegiate basketball
sends the "psychological message" that girls are " 'second class' or that
their athletic role is of less value than that of boys. " 121
In another case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that girls were disadvantaged by the scheduling of the majority of their
basketball games on weeknights (Monday through Thursday). 122 Boys'
games were scheduled on Fridays and Saturdays to maximize attendance
by parents and other fans: a practice that also minimized for boys-but
maximized for girls-the academic inconvenience of playing and travel
ing on school nights. 123 In addition to these tangible disparities, the court
also recognized the denigrating effect of unequal treatment: "the practice
of scheduling almost twice as many boys' basketball games on primetime
nights sends a message that female athletes are subordinate to their male
counterparts and are 'second-class.' "124 The foregoing case illustrations
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
m1d.
116 Robinson, supra note 113, at 336.
117 See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 838 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), ajf'd, 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005), ajf'd, 459 F.3d
676 (6th Cir. 2006).
118 Id. at 807.
119
Id. at 838.
1201d. at 824, 837.
121 Id. at 837.
122 Parker v. Franklin Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 923-924 (7th Cir. 2012).
123 Id.
1241d. at 923.
114
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show the negative effects of sex-discrimination-derived stigma in the ath
letics context. Degendering sport is a way to mitigate this concern.

B. Unequal Resources
One of the most recognizable downsides to separating athletic op
portunities by sex is the risk that separate programs in the allocation of
resources and opportunities. 125 Title IX and equal protection doctrine
both attempt to mitigate this risk by requiring separate programs receive
equal treatment as measured by such tangible factors as the quantity of
opportunities and the qualities of facilities, uniforms, equipment, sched
ule of competition, access to coaching, and other aspects of the pro
gram. 126 Yet there is evidence that such inequalities persist. 127 And when
they do, they signal to girls that their athletic pursuits are not as worthy
as those of boys. Title IX and equal protection doctrine require that "sep
arate be equal, "128 but in reality, it rarely is. Segregated sports facilitate
inequitable allocation of resources that tend to track cultural bias in favor
of men's sports. 129 For example, high school booster clubs are more en
thusiastic about and successful at raising funds to support boys' sports. 130
Despite OCR' s insistence that uneven fundraising by booster clubs does
not excuse unequal treatment, unequal treatment nevertheless occurs. 131
These inequities not only ensure that boys teams are better equipped to
cultivate athletic talent, but also serve to make athletic opportunities more
attractive to boys than to girls.
11

11

Obviously, unequal resources contribute to observed gender differ
ences to some extent. Gender-free sports can mitigate the replication of
gender stereotypes that occurs when athletic opportunities are separated
by sex because they remove the structural vulnerability to inequitable

125 Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Spons: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppres
sion, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1627, 1630, 1633--35 (1997).
126 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31-106.42 (2018).
127 Postsecondary athletics Title IX complaints have risen in recent years. See generally Celene
Reynolds, The Mobilization of Title IX across U.S. Colleges and Universities, 1994-2014, 66 Social
Problems 245, 255-56 (2019). According to one recent study, "[c]omplaints citing three athletic
issues-interests and abilities (106.41cl), equal opportunity (106.4lc), and meeting the requirements
of part three of the three-part test (106.41cl-3)-represent[ed] 74 percent of the total filings in
2014." Id. at 256.
128 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(b-c) (2018).
129 See generally George, supra note 56, at 1113-32.
130 See generally Powell Latimer, Title IX compliance sometimes means turning down money,
STARNEWS ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2010), https://www.starnewsonline.com/news/20101128/title-ix
compliance-sometirnes-means-tuming-down-money?fbclid = IwAR3UXhsKDBui7X2hg-oGJPgCgg
PsdRTUfJ aGS-vOQYbHPh7I2knpnZw lrVY [https://perma.cc/6RX7-6H39].
131 Letter from Thomas J. Hibino, Regional Director, Office of Civil Rights to Dr. Dorothy Galo,
Superintendent, Hingham Public School District (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www2.ed.gov/about/of
fices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/O 1105003-a.htmlb
[https: //perma. cc/2ZF6-FMEU]
("Where
booster clubs provide benefits or services that assist only teams of one sex, the district must ensure
that teams of the other sex receive equivalent benefits and services.").
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distribution of resources. Whether its financial support comes entirely
from the schools or is supplemented by third-party fundraising, a single
team that is open to boys and girls alike ensures that all members have
the same quality of coaching, the same opportunities for practice and
competition, and the same perks and benefits that makes athletic partici
pation attractive and enjoyable. Equal investment of resources will pro
vide female athletes opportunities to cultivate their athletic abilities.
C. Transgender Inclusion
In addition to pushing back on the stigma inherent in separation,
gender-free sports also reinforce the rationale for transgender inclusion,
as well as provide opportunities for those who identify as non-binary to
participate without having to compromise the affirmation of that identity.

Massachusetts is among several other states in which the athletic
association governing high school sports provides an unqualified right to
transgender students to participate in athletics in the category that corre
sponds to their gender identity. 132 Specifically, the MIAA' s policy is to
rely on the gender determination made by the student's district, 133 which
as a matter of state law "shall mean a person's gender-related identity,
appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, ap
pearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with
the person's physiology or assigned sex at birth. "134 At least one school
district has adopted a specific policy of its own which guarantees
transgender students the right to participate in athletics according to their
gender identity-in addition to addressing related, off-the-field issues like
inclusive bathrooms and locker room facilities. 135 But even in districts
132 See, e.g., WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, 2018-19 OFFICIAL
HANDBOOK 32-33 (2018), http://www.wiaa.com/conDocs/Con1782/Handbook%20Website.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UFJ4-Q8P6]. Additionally, athletic associations in California, Colorado, Connect
icut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming have similar inclusive policies, many
of them modeled on Washington's. See Erin Buzuvis, As Who They Really Are: Expanding Oppor
tunities for Transgender Athletics to Panicipate in Youth and Scholastic Spans, 34 LAW & INEQ.
341, 348-50 (2016); K-12 Policies, TRANSATHLETE (last visited Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.trans
athlete.com/k-12 [https://perma.cc/62YH-'IT6V] (listing high school policies for transgender stu
dent athletes from throughout the United States). As policies of state athletic associations, these rules
create rights as a matter of private law that schools agree to uphold as a condition for membership
in the associations. In some of these states, transgender students' rights that exist as a matter of
private law are also protected by public law, a statute or regulatory interpretation thereof. See, e.g.,
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221.5(f) (West 2018); Buzuvis, supra, at 362.
133 See MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at42. Rule 43.3.l of the MIAA's Rules and Regulations
Governing Athletes states: "A student shall not be excluded from participation on a gender-specific
sports team that is consistent with the student's bona fide gender identity." Id.
134 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl.59 (2018) (defining "Gender identity").
135 See generally FRAMINGHAM HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT, FRAMINGHAM HIGH
SCHOOL ATHLETIC HANDBOOK FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES, COACHES, AND PARENTS 4-5 (2019
2020),
https://www.framingham.kl2.ma.us/cms/lib/MA01907569/Centricity/Domain/81/2018
2019%20SY%20Meetings/05.0l.19/V. %20E. %20%20FHS %20Athletics %20Handbook.docx.pdf
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that have not adopted such a policy, the state law itself creates the expec
tation that school officials would acknowledge a transgender student's
affirmed gender identity for all purposes, including athletics.

1. Benefits to Transgender Youth
Thus, in Massachusetts-and in the other states whose athletic as
sociations have similarly inclusive policies-a transgender athlete's par
ticipation in the category that matches their gender identity is unqualified:
it is not subject to any special considerations, such as safety or competi
tive equity, as is the case in several states. 136 It is also not conditioned on
any particular medical intervention, such as hormone treatment, as poli
cies in other states require. 137 In reality, this means a transgender girl is
permitted to play girls' sports, and a transgender boy has the same rights
with respect to boys' sports. Such inclusion affirms the athlete's gender
identity and thus serves as a powerful source of socioemotional support.
It also serves as a protective factor against psychological and emotional
damage, including depression, anxiety, and self-harm, to which
transgender youth are vulnerable. 138 On the other hand, excluding a
[https://perma.cc/55GF-68PJ] [hereinafter FRAMINGHAM HANDBOOK] (stating the school's "Inclu
sive Sports Participation Policy"); Jim Haddadin, Framingham: New School Policy Supports
Transgender Athletes, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.metrowestdailyn
ews.com/news/20180313/framingham-new-school-policy-supports-transgender-athletes
[https: //perma.cc/6G4E-ABG8].
136
See, e.g.. MAINE PRINCIPALS' ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK 19-21 (2019-2020),
http://www.mpa.cc/images/pdfs/handbookl920.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J3W-P8P4]; NEW JERSEY
STATE INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, NJSIAA & NJSCA COACHES HANDBOOK 20
22
(2019--2020),
https://www .njsiaa.org/sites/default/files/document/Coaches %20Hand
book%202019-2020. pdf [https://perma.cc/5PQA-JJRE].
137 See, e.g. , NEBRASKA SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, GENDER
PARTICIPATION POLICY 34-37 (2019-2020), https://nsaa-static.s3.amazonaws.com/textfile/yb/by
laws.pdf [bttps://perma.cc/2JQL-VH3D]. Athletic associations in Delaware, Idaho, Missouri, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin also have policies that require medical
transition. See Buzuvis, supra note 132, at 345-46; For a critique of policies that require hormone
treatments as a condition for trans gender student's participation in athletics that correspond to gender
identity, see id. at 364-74.
In Texas, for school athletics, a student's gender "shall be determined based on [the] student's
birth certificate." UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND CONTEST RULES,
NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICY 53 (2019-2020), https://www.uiltexas.org/files/policy/2019-2020
full-uil-<:onstitution. pdf [https://perma.cc/L2WP-YD36]. Five other states-Alabama, Indiana, Lou
isiana, Kentucky, North Carolina-limit an athlete's participation to the designation on their birth
certificate, effectively prohibiting transgender students from competing according to their gender
identities, while the remaining state athletic associations have either no policy or a policy of leaving
it up to individual schools to decide. See Buzuvis, supra note 132, at 343-45; for a critique of these
policies, see id. at 352-63.
138 See M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modem
Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 957-58 (2015) (citing an amicus
brief prepared by the American Academy of Pediatrics and other leading medical organizations, in
support of a transgender student's case challenging her exclusion from facilities that correspond to
her gender identity); Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D'Augelli, Transgender Youth and Life
Threatening Behaviors, 37 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 527, 534-35 (2007); GABE
MURCHISON, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, SUPPORTING AND CARING FOR TRANSGENDER CHILDREN
12-17 (Sep. 2016), https: II assets2 .hrc .org/files/documents/SupportingCaringforTransChildren. pdf

2019]

Attorney General v. MIAA at Forty Years

23

transgender student from the sports that match their gender identity, as
well as imposing requirements on their participation that do not apply to
other students, stigmatizes them and contributes to the potential for psy
chological harm. 139 In addition, exclusionary policies that restrict an ath
lete's gender-identity-based participation would likely deter many
transgender athletes from participating in sports altogether. Thus, inclu
sive policies maximize opportunities for transgender students to attain the
benefits of athletic participation on one's physical health, character, aca
demic performance, peer relationships, and self-esteem-a privilege
owned by other students . 140
Yet despite these powerful benefits to transgender athletes them
selves, critics of their inclusion-particularly the inclusion of transgender
girls in girls' sports-have argued that opening up girls' sports to partic
ip<1.tion by transgender girls is unfair to their cisgender competitors be
cause it puts the latter at a competitive disadvantage. 141 Just as legislators
in the 1970s assumed that girls needed protection from the dominance of
boys, whom they deemed categorically superior athletes solely by virtue
of their sex, these critics also. view transgender girls as categorically su
perior athletes solely by virtue of their having been assigned male at
birth. 142 But the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Attorney General
v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association rejected the idea
that girls are categorically and always in need of protection from the
participation of boys-a holding that logically extends to support the in
clusion of transgender girls as well. 143 Thus, in Massachusetts (of all
states), because of its exceptional state constitutional law permitting boys
to play on girls' teams, arguments against the participation of pre-transi
tion transgender girls are particularly out of place. By normalizing coed
competition, the existence of gender-free athletic opportunities would by
extension render trans gender girls' inclusion less controversial and might
therefore encourage more transgender girls to avail themselves of the
[https://perma.cc/KX28-QJSY] (position statement of the American College of Osteopathic Pedia
tricians and the American Pediatric Osteopathy Association).
139 Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1306-07 (M.D. Fla. 2018)
(acknowledging the stigma in excluding transgender students from facilities that correspond to their
gender identities); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 725 (D. Md. 2018)
(finding that the exclusion of a transgender student from the locker room that corresponds to his
gender identity is harmful to the student, because it interferes with the student's gender transition
and thus exacerbates gender dysphoria).
140 See Richard Bailey, Evaluating the Relationship between Physical Education, Spon and Social
Inclusion, 57 EDUC. REV. 71, 80 (2005); Michael W. Beets & Kenneth H. Pitetti, Contribution of
Physical Education and Spon to Health-Related Fitness in High School Students, 75 J. SCH. HEALTH
25, 28 (2005); Russell R. Pate et al., Spons Panicipation and Health-Related Behaviors Among US
Youth, 154 ARCH. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 904 (2000).
141 See generally Yannis Pitsiladis et al., Beyond Fairness: The Biology of Inclusion. for
Transgender and Intersex Athletes, 15 CURRENT SPORTS MED. REPORTS 386 (2016).
142 See, e.g., Sangree, supra note 56, at 417-18 (discussing the legislators' paternalistic motiva
tions in passing Title IX); Michael J. Lenzi, The Trans Athlete Dilemma: A Constitutional
Transgender Student-Athlete Polices, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (describing two examples of
transgendered students-athletes winning a competition and generating controversy).
143 See Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass 'n, 393 N.E.2d at 294-95.
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opportunity.
Finally, the option to engage in gender-free sports could promote
participation among transgender girls and transgender boys by giving
them an alternative to what in some cases might be inferior alternatives.
Sometimes transgender athletes, particularly transgender female athletes,
are criticized and harassed for asserting their right to compete with
girls. 144 A gender-free option would minimize this risk while still provid
ing an alternative to the potentially delegitimizing experience of compet
ing in one's natal'sex category.

2. Benefits to non-binary students
Not all transgender students identify as male or female. In fact,
there are likely more transgender students who identify themselves as
something other than male or female, such as non-binary or genderqueer,
than there are transgender students who do identify as male or female. 145
Yet, trans gender students in this category are often an afterthought in
discussions about their inclusion in sport, which mostly focus on when
and whether a transgender individual who identifies as male or female
can participate on teams that correspond to that gender. This does not
mean non-binary students are entirely excluded from athletic participa
tion, since inclusive and exclusive policies alike would permit non-binary
students to at least participate on the teams that match their birth or legal
sex. 146 But in light of the fact that nearly all high school athletic opportu
nities are designated as male or female, non-binary athletes, unlike other
athletes, almost never have the option to participate in athletics in a cat
egory that validates their gender identity. 147 The introduction of some
gender-free options would give non-binary athletes the option to partici
pate in a manner that does not create the dissonance between the activity's
gendered context and the athlete's sense of self. 148
144
See, e.g., Katie Barnes, They Are Champions, ESPNW (May 29, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/espnw/feature/23592317 /how-two-transgender-athletes-fighting-compete
sports-love [https://perma.cc/NT35-WFQY] (describing public criticism faced by transgender fe
male athlete).
145
Esther L. Meerwijk & Jae M. Sevelius, Transgender Population Size in the United States: A
Meta-Regression of Population-Based Probability Samples, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH el, e6 (Feb.
2017).
146 Some inclusive policies go further and permit non-binary students to choose whichever cate
gory feels like the best fit. See, e.g., FRAMINGHAM HANDBOOK, supra note 135, at 4-5.
147 Caroline Voyles, Sex Segregation in Sport: A Denial of Rights and Opportunities for Health,
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (June 28, 2019), https://www.hhrjoumal.org/2019/06/sex-segregation-in
sport-a~denial-of-rights-and-opportunities-for-health/ [https: //perma.cc/7CR7-VPCP].
148 Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 967 (2019) ("The best
way to accommodate non-binary athletes may be incremental moves toward eliminating sex classi
fications in sports."); Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender,
31 WIS. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 29, 48 (2016) ("The approach of eliminating gender categories [in
sporting events] would also be inclusive of those individuals whose gender-identities are non-binary
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Transgender students may have expanding opportunities to easily
change their legal sex to non-binary-a change that, while positive in
many ways, could theoretically limit their legal rights to access athletic
opportunities designated by binary gender category. The state of Califor
nia for examplepermits those citizens with a non-binary gender identity
to amend the gender designation on their birth certificates to a non-binary
designation. 149 Additionally, California state law already permits
transgender students to participate in athletics in a manner "consistent
with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the
pupil's records. "150 It is possible that a non-binary student's decision to
amend their birth certificate to list their non-binary gender designation
could create confusion over which athletic opportunities are appropriate
for the students, since technically, neither girls' nor boys' sports are con
sistent with either the student's gender identity or the gender listed on
their records, depending on what "records" the school official decided to
consider. To be sure, a school district's decision to prohibit a non-binary
student from participating in both boys' and girls' athletics altogether
would absurdly and unnecessarily pervert the spirit of the laws in Cali
fornia, designed to maximize inclusion and recognition for all
transgender individuals, including those who identify as non-binary. 151
But gender-free athletic options would mitigate the vulnerability of non
binary students to this exclusion by ensuring some athletic opportunities
would remain available even if a school official chose to interpret the law
in this restrictive way. More importantly, the promotion of gender-free
athletic opportunities would be an appropriate response to the increasing
legal recognition of non-binary identities because laws that legalize non
binary gender designations are responsive to, and promoting of, an un
derstanding of the complexity of gender and recognition of the limitations
of only two categories.
IV.

DEGENDERING SPORT: START WITH GoLF

While acknowledging that some degree of separation is warranted
to ensure that athletic opportunities are preserved for girls, this Article
has so far pushed back on the idea that all opportunities must be sepa
rated.Gender-free athletic options are consistent with Massachusetts con
stitutional law, 152 mitigate stereotypes about female inferior athleticism,
or fluid.").
149 See S.B. 179, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
ISO CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 221.S(t) (West 2018).
1s1 See, e.g., Gender Recognition Act, S.B. 179, 2017-18 Sess. (CA 2017) ("It is the policy of
the State of California that every person deserves full legal recognition and equal treatment under
the law and to ensure that intersex, trans gender, and nonbinary people have state-issued identification
documents that provide full legal recognition of their accurate gender identity.").
152 See supra Part I.
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promotes equal treatment of athletes within the same sport, and reflect
the principles and best practices of transgender inclusion.153 But as a
practical matter, how do we determine which opportunities are appropri
ate for continued segregation, and which should be integrated and desig
nated for all athletes regardless of gender?
To answer this question, sport organizers should consider the extent
to which girls' participation currently benefits from protectionism inher
ent in segregation, as well as whether changing to an integrated model
has the potential to enhance participation, such as by removing structural
inequalities that could be suppressing girls' interest. If separation in a
given sport contributes relatively little to girls' current participation, and
integration offers high potential to improve girls' participation, then this
sport is a good candidate for integration. This part will apply this formula
to the sport of high school golf as it is played in Massachusetts and con
clude that the sport is a good candidate to be reorganized without regard
to participants' gender.
A. Few Female Golfers Currently Benefit from Protectionist
Segregation
The reason schools segregate sports by sex is to ensure that girls
have similar opportunities as boys to benefit from athletic participation.
Historic and continued discrimination that can reasonably be expected to
have impaired their interests and abilities, as well as generalized physical
differences that could disproportionately disadvantage girls in some ath
letic opportunities if those opportunities were distributed without regard
to gender on basis of talent alone. Recent surveys reflect that boys al
ready receive the majority of high school athletic opportunities, both na
tionally (approximately 57% for the 2018-2019 school year) 154 and in the
state of Massachusetts (approximately 51 % for the 2018-2019 school
year), 155 highlighting the particular importance of protecting girls' exist
ing opportunities. Nevertheless, while girls' sports are important to that
end, segregation is not the only way to ensure girls' participation. Exclu
sions based on sex should be narrowly-tailored per the Supreme Judicial

153

See supra Part 11.
KARISSA L. NIEHOFF, NAT'L FED'N OF HIGH SCH. Ass'NS, 2019-20 NFHS HANDBOOK 54
(2019),
https://www.nfhs.org/media/1020439/2019-20-nfhs-handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EXK7-F6G2]. This figure was calculated by dividing the number of boy survey
participants from 2018-19 by the total number of participants. See id.
155 MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC AsS'N, 2018-2019 ATHLETICS PARTICIPATION SURVEY
(last visited Jan. 22, 2020), http://www.miaa.net/gen/miaa generated bin/documents/basic mod
ule/ParticipationSurveyOverview201819. pdf [https: //perma-:-cc/83J7-3W96] [hereinafter MIAA
PARTICIPATION SURVEY]. This figure was calculated by dividing the number of boy survey partici
pants from 2018-19 by the total number of participants. See id.
154
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Court's analysis in Attorney General v. M/AA. 156 Tactics like degender
ing select sports, which do not threaten to diminish existing opportuni
ties, should be considered.
Girls are already an extreme minority among Massachusetts high
school golfers. There were 670 of them for the 2018-2019 school year
the most recent year for which complete data is available-compared to
4212 boys. 157 Many high school sports are dominated by one sex or the
other. 158 For example, girls make up less than 1 % of all Massachusetts
high school football players. 159 But golf, in which girls constitute approx
imately 13 % of all participants, 160 experiences this gender imbalance
even though it is both a boys' and girls' sport. 161

B. The (Former) Tournament Rule Discriminated Against
Girls on Boys Teams
Moreover, there is reason to suspect that girls' interests and abilities
in golf, reflected in their low participation noted above, are suppressed
by structural differences that would not exist if golf was organized as a
gender-free opportunity. One clear example of discrimination against fe
male golfers was recently addressed by the MIAA when it changed the
rule that required female golfers who play on boys' teams to nevertheless
participate in the girls' post-season individual tournament, which takes
place in a different season than the boys' . 162 Former rule 43.2.1.2 was
intended to protect girls' athletic opportunities: because it also prohibited
boys on girls' teams from competing for an individual post-season title
against girls, it ensured that only girls can compete for the girls' individ
ual championships. 163 It also arguably protected girls' opportunities by
allowing them to bypass the boys' post-season tournament ai1d compete
individually in a post-season girls' tournament instead. Yet however well
intentioned, the rule discriminated against female golfers. The girls'
156

Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 296.
MIAA PARTICIPATION SURVEY, supra note 155, at 1.
158 See Id.
m Id. This figure was calculated by dividing the total number of girls reported to be playing
football by the total number of football players.
160
Id. This figure was calculated by dividing the total number of girls reported to be playing golf
by the total number of golf players.
161 Some other sports with both boy and girl participants have a higher proportion of girls to boys
than that in golf. For instance, for 2018-2019, girls constituted approximately 22% of all rugby
players, and approximately 23% of all ice hockey players. Id. There are also sports-such as field
hockey-in which girls significantly outnumber boys. Id.
162 See Craig Larson, MIAA Revises Rules on Mixed-gender Teams, BOSTON GLOBE (Sep. 26,
2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/high
schools/2018/09/26/schnotes/TZzK2qBBPxOyqjhZqDielM/story .html
[https: //perma.cc/Y79F
WU9N].
163 See MIAA HANDBOOK 2017-2019, supra note 91. Before the Oct. 3, 2018 revision, Rule
43.2.1.2 included references to "individual golf .... " Larson, supra note 162.
157
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regular season is in the spring, which meant that any female golfer on a
boys' team must defer their individual title aspirations for an entire sea
son. 164 Also, because the high school post-season tournaments in Massa
chusetts serve to determine both team and individual champions, girls
could in fact participate in the tournament, but only in the limited capac
ity as a member of her team. 165 A girl who happened to play well in that
capacity might help her team but would be ineligible for individual
awards that her score would have entitled her to had she been a male
member of her team. 166
This is precisely what happened to Emily Nash on October 24,
2017, when she competed in the Division III boys golf Central Mass
regional tournament in Uxbridge, Massachusetts. 167 That day, shooting
from the back tee, Nash shot 3 below a par of 75-the lowest score of
the tournament. 168 Yet the male athlete who took four more strokes than
Nash was awarded the individual regional championship and the oppor
tunity to move on to the state championship. 169 This outcome took the
media by surprise, and stories about the girl denied the championship
title she had clearly earned spread quickly around the world, 170 especially
the world of golf. 171 The disputed fact that Nash and her coach knew or
164 The MIAA Golf Committee reiterated this rule in the 2017 Boys' Fall Golf Sport Specific
Information, which states-as a rule for 2017 boys' Fall golf sectional/state tournaments-that
"[g]irls playing on a fall boys team CANNOT BE ENTERED IN THE BOYS FALL INDIVIDUAL
TOURNAMENT. THEY CAN ONLY PLAY IN THE BOYS TEAM TOURNAMENT If qualified,
they can play in the spring Girls Sectional and State Championships." MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC
ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2017 BOYS' FALL GOLF SPORT SPECIFIC INFORMATION 5 (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://miaa.net/ gen/miaa_generated_bin/documents/basic_module/ golffall20 l 7format. pdf
[https://perma.cc/72ZV-84LM].
l6.5 Id.
166 Id.
167 Lunenburg Girl Won a Boys' Golf Tournament but Was Denied the Trophy, BOSTON GLOBE
(Oct. 25, 2017), https ://www.bostonglobe.com/ sports/high-schools/2017I10/25/lunenberg-emily
nash-won-boys-golf-toumament-but-was-denied-winner-trophy-because-she-girl/WtZDRn
hPDe8rd7Bv5vMJ5J /story .html [https://perma.cc/65L7-N73B].
168 Id.
169
Camila Domonoske, Winner Of High School Golf Tournament Denied Trophy, Because She's
A Girl, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo
way /2017I10/26/560210230/winner-of-high-school-golf-toumament-denied-trophy-because-shes-a
girl [https ://perma. cc/STU7-W7TT].
170 See Callum Borchers, A High School Athletic Association Took Away Emily Nash's Golf Tro
phy, Then Somehow Made Things Worse, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017 /10/27 /a-high-school-athletic-association-took-away-emily
nashs-golf-trophy-then-somehow-made-things-worse/?utrn_term= .96ac23c39698
[https://perma.cc/SQ8B-ELXZ]; Domonoske, supra note 169; James Gordon, High School Golfer
Is Not Awarded First-Place Trophy After Winning a Tournament - Because She's a Girl, DAILY
MAIL (U.K.) (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5017901/High-schoolgirl
golfer-not-awarded-place-trophy.htrnl [https://perma.cc/JCE7-ZDBD]; Kay, supra note 4; National
Outcry After Nash Ruled Ineligible for Golf Title, WORCESTER SENT. & ENTER. (Jan. 1, 2018),
http: I /www.sentinelandenterprise.com/highschoolsports/ ci_31562283 I national-outcry-after-nash
ruled-ineligible-golf-title [https://perma.cc/8C49-FLVY].
171 T.J. Auclair, Emily Nash, Who Was Denied Trophy in Boys' Tournament She Won, Receives
Invitation to Annika Invitational, PGA (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.pga.com/news/golf
buzz/ernily-nash-who-denied-trophy-in-boys-toumament-won-receives-invitation-annika
[https://perma.cc/UR26-Q8H5]; Bill Speros, Outrage Grows as High School Golfer Emily Nash
Gets No Relief from Massachusetts Rules Committee, GOLFWEEK (Oct. 26, 2017),
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should have known about the rule, 172 as well as the fact that Nash would
have an opportunity to compete for an individual title in the girls' tour
nament held in the spring, did little to mitigate criticism of the Massa
chusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association for the unfair outcome of the
Division III tournament.
Nash was not even the first female golfer negatively affected by
former Rule 43.2.1.2. In 2005, Lindsey Thomka, a member of the boys'
golf team at Springfield's Cathedral High School, sued the MIAA for the
right to participate as an individual in the boys' post-season tournament
notwithstanding Rule 43 .2.1.2. 173 Then, as now, the MIAA sponsored
boys' regional and state tournaments in the fall to determine team and
individual post-season champions, while a state tournament for girls was
held in the spring. 174 The Cathedral team's overall performance in the
regional tournament did not qualify it for advancement to the state tour
nament, but Thomka individually earned the fourth-best score. 175 Based
on that performance, she would have had the opportunity to continue on
and compete for the individual title if she had been a boy, but former
Rule 43.2.1.2 prohibited her from doing so. 176 Instead, MIAA officials
insisted that Thomka' s opportunity to compete for an individual title
would have to wait for spring when the girls' tournament took place. 177
This exclusion prompted Thomka' s lawsuit, which resulted in a prelimi
nary injunction that allowed her to compete in the boys' tournament. 178
In response to the court's order, the MIAA accepted Thomka into the
tournament and sua sponte suspended the rule that required girls to play
from the front tees. 179 Thomka competed in the state tournament from the
back tees, and she finished the tournament in last place. 180
In 2007, the superior court in Hampden County issued a permanent
injunction against former Rule 43 .2.1.2-as it applies to female golfers-

http://golfweek.com/2017I10/26/outrage-grows-as-high-school-golfer-emily-nash-gets-no-relief
from-massachusetts-rules-committee/ [https://perma.cc/ZZJ3-WQ4L].
172 Nash told one reporter that she "wasn't aware, until after [her] round that if [she] won, [she]
wouldn't be able to get the title or the trophy." Bill Doyle, Lunenburg's Emily Nash 'disappointed'
with ML4A rule preventing her from winning Division 3 golf title, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Oct. 25,
2017),
https://www.telegram.com/ sports/20171025/lunenburgs-emily-nash-disappointed-with
miaa-rule-preventing-her-from-winning-division-3-golf-title [https: //perma.cc/6EZL-6QYU].
173 Thomka v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 051028, 2007 WL 867084, at *1-4
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2007), ajf'd in part, vacated in part, 952 N.E.2d 462 (Mass. App. Ct.
2011).
174 Id. at *2.
175 Id. at *3.
176 Id. at *5.
m Id. at *1-2.
178 Id. at *3.
179
Thomka's lawsuit did not challenge either the MIAA's general rule restricting her to the front
tees, nor did she challenge the decision to suspend the rule and make her play from the back tees in
the state tournament. Id. at *3-4.
180 Id. at *4.
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on the grounds that it violated the state constitution's ERA. 181 As the
court saw it, the rule was facially neutral because it appeared to provide
"equal opportunities for male and female athletes to compete for individ
ual, as well as team championships, in their respective sports. "182 But its
application is disadvantageous to female golfers whose schools choose
only to sponsor a fall team. Those girls are denied an opportunity to
compete for an individual title "against the same level of competition and
some of the same competitors they faced through the fall season when
their skills are their sharpest after having been honed by a season of ca
maraderie, coaching, and competition. " 183 The court acknowledged that
female golfers who compete on boys' teams in the fall and also play other
sports in the spring are particularly inconvenienced by the delay between
the regular and post-season play since they have little opportunity to prac
tice on their own in preparation for the golf tournament. 184 They might
experience this interruption not only as a logistical challenge (i.e., man
aging the competing time demands of two post-seasons at once) but also
as something that diminishes the personal significance of the post-season
golf opportunities (it has lesser value to these athletes because it occurs
during "softball season" or however they may view the spring). Boys
have no such problem since at the time of the court's decision, the MIAA
held boys' championship golf tournaments in both the spring and the
fall. 185 And, while the MIAA has since discontinued the boys' spring
tournament, 186 the disparity persists because there are no Massachusetts
high schools that only sponsor a girls' golf team without offering a coun
terpart opportunity to boys. 187 As such, all male golfers in Massachusetts
compete in the fall-the same season as their individual's tournament
and the disadvantage of having one's regular team season and individual
tournament scheduled in different seasons is still one that only female
golfers face.
On appeal, however, the state appellate court vacated the injunction
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not provided notice to the Attorney
General-a required condition to litigate state constitutional claims. 188 As
a result, former Rule 43.2.1.2 was still in effect in the fall of 2017 when
it prevented regional tournament winner Emily Nash from receiving the
181

Id. at *8.
Id. at *6.
183 Id. at *7.
184 Id.
185 Id. at *2.
186 The MIAA's current Rule 35.1.1 states, in relevant part, "[a] school may offer golf in either
Fall or Spring, but the Boys Team Tournament is held in the Fall and the Girls Team Tournament
is held in the Spring." MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 36.
187 See MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC Ass'N, PARTICIPATION SURVEY DATA (last visited
Feb.
12,
2020),
http://miaa.net/con
tentm/easy_pages/view .php?page_id = 137&sid=38&menu_id=214
[https://perma.cc/L9WY-957K].
188 Thomka v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1105, 2011WL3802192,
at *l (2011).
182
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individual regional championship title or moving on to the state tourna
ment. Indeed, the only rule change to come out of the Thomka case was
an amendment clarifying that the rule restricting girls to hitting from the
front tees only applies to the regular season. 189 Even though Thomka' s
lawsuit failed because of a procedural issue rather than the substance of
its equal protection argument, the MIAA continued to exclude girls from
competing for individual titles in the premier fall tournament. 190 It took
the national public outcry to the tournament rule's application to Emily
Nash to force the MIAA to revisit the rule. 191
In October 2018, the MIAA eliminated individual golf from the
tournament rule (Rule 43.2.1.2), that restricted athletes on cross-sex
teams to compete only in the post-season tournaments designated for their
sex. 192 Now, a female golfer who participates on a boys team in the fall
may still participate in the girls' spring tournament, but she may also
participate in the fall boys' fall tournament as both an individual and a
member of her team, to the extent she qualifies like any other golfer.
Yet, because this rule was only recently changed, it nevertheless provides
important context for disproportionately low (when compared to the pro
portion of participants) interest and participation of girls in high school
189 See MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 67. Rule 70.2 and 70.3 of the MIAA's Rules and
Regulations Governing Athletes state:
70.2.Female golfers participating on a boys' team during the regular season play must hit
from the tee box that is placed closest (yet in front of) the tee box the boys' team is
hitting from (regardless of marker color).

70.3.Female golfers competing on a boys' team must hit from the boys' tees at the MIAA
Divisional and State Tournaments.
Id.
190 Not only did the tournament violate the Massachusetts ERA, it likely would have been found
to violate Title IX if it had been challenged on those grounds as well. For one reason, the MIAA
may be found to have failed to provide "equal athletic opportunity" for boys and girls, considering
the MIAA's inequitable "[s]cheduling of games and practice time . . . . " See 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c)(3) (2018). For another, MIAA's facially neutral policy resulted in Nash being treated
differently from her male teammates-had they been the top-performing tournament team members,
as opposed to Nash. For one circuit court that faced a case that arose under similar circumstances
to Nash's, such inequality amounted to sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. See Mercer v.
Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Duke University violated Title IX
when the coach allowed a female kicker to try out and make the football team, but then excluded
her from participation in the sport on the basis of her sex.); see also David S. Cohen, Emily Nash
Denied Boys' Golf Trophy - Which Violates Title IX, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 26, 2017),
https: //www. rollings tone. com/ cul ture/culture-sports/ emily-nash-denied-boys-golf-trophy-which-vi
olates-title-ix-115296/ [https://perma.cc/ES8U-ESXP] (applying Mercer to the tournament rule and
concluding that it violates Title IX because, like Duke's treatment of Mercer, the tournament rule
permits a golfer like Emily Nash to compete alongside boys but then distinguishes her and limits
quality of her opportunity because of sex).
191 Greg Dudek, MIAAforms committee to study rule that denied Emily Nash golf trophy, BOSTON
HERALD (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bostonherald.com/2017I12/08/miaa-forms-committee-to
study-rule-that-denied-emily-nash-golf-trophyI [https ://perma. cc/9JJD-3N5T].
192 See Larson, supra note 162 ("As of [Sep. 26, 2018], the words 'boys' and 'individual golf
were removed from Rules 43.2.1and43.2.1.2 in the MIAA Handbook regarding 'Boys' and Girls'
on the Same Team.' And in the MIAA's Tournament Format for golf, the postseason is listed as
'2018 Fall Golf Championship,' with no reference to gender."); see also MIAA HANDBOOK 2017
2019, supra note 91.
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golf. For the large number of high school girls in Massachusetts, whose
schools have no girls' golf team, the unequal opportunities that have per
sisted for girls who play on boys' teams has surely signaled the sport as
less than appealing and welcoming to girls.

C. Girls Who Play on Girls' Teams Are Disadvantaged by the
Spring Season
Another disparity that has likely suppressed girls' participation in
golf-and which will continue to do so-is the scheduling of girls' golf
in the spring season. Spring is a disadvantageous season for high school
golf in Massachusetts. The weather in spring is less reliably suitable for
golf than that in fall, 193 in which golf enjoys a longer season under more
advantageous conditions. 194 In addition, fall is the season for college
recruiting and applications . 195 Similar facts about spring and fall golf led
a federal district court in Michigan to conclude that the state athletic as
sociation violated Title IX because spring, the season for girls' golf for
most of the state, was disadvantageous compared to the fall when boys'
golf was played. 196 The court found that, "In Michigan, the golf courses
are in better condition during the fall season. Girls are more likely to
face cold, icy weather and frozen or muddy golf course greens in the
spring and do not have the advantage of starting the season on a course
which has been groomed all summer. " 197 Moreover, the fact that Michi
gan golf courses close in the winter (as they do in Massachusetts) means
that "Michigan girls begin their spring high school season without the
benefit of playing during the winter and score more poorly" than golfers
who compete in the fall. 198 Finally, "because the NCAA letter of intent
signing date is in early November, Michigan boys have four years of golf
experience and scores on which to be evaluated. Michigan girls only have
three years because their season occurs after the letter of intent signing

193 See Rick Rendell, Snow problems wreak havoc on the start of spring sports practice,
METROWEST
DAILY
NEWS
(Mar.
21,
2016),
http://www.metrowestdailyn
ews.com/sports/20160321/snow-problems-wreak-havoc-on-start-of-spring-sports-practice
[https://perma.cc/EH43-SB8R] (describing the impact of late snow on spring sports in Massachu
setts); Brittney McNamara, Heavy snow and lasting winter weather delay spring sports, WICKED
LOCAL (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.wickedlocal.com/article/20150307/NEWS/150306939
[https://perma.cc/XG4L-5DV3] (describing the same problem in another year).
194 See Thomka, 2007 WL 867084, at *l. Though the court was not asked to decide whether the
girls' spring season was discriminatory in light of the boys' season in the fall, it did acknowledge
the disadvantage of golfing in the spring as part of its analysis of the discriminatory effect of Rule
43.2.1.2. Id. at *5-7.
195 Id. at *4.
196 Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
197 Id. at 832. The district court's findings about golf and its conclusion that the MSHAA discrim
inated against girls by scheduling it in the spring was later affirmed by the 6th Circuit. Cmtys. for
Equity, 377 F.3d at 515.
198 Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
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date. "199 To be sure, the fact (if proven) that spring is the disadvantageous
season for golf in Massachusetts would not be conclusive of discrimina
tion under Title IX and equal protection, but rather would be a component
in a wider analysis of disadvantageous seasons. That said, there do not
appear to be any other sports that are scheduled in different seasons for
boys and girls that have raised these concerns. 200
Gender-free golf is one solution that would address both the dis
crimination that results from scheduling the girls' regular season at a
disadvantageous time of year and the discrimination against female golf
ers on boys' fall teams whose individual post-season does not occur until
spring. The MIAA could consolidate all high school golf in the fall or
continue to have fall and spring seasons from which member schools
could choose. Either way, limitations on available facilities would not
create a gender-based disparity. All golfers would be eligible to compete
for the individual title in the post-season championships that serve as
capstones to the regular season.
D. Degendered Golf Poses Minimal Risk of Reducing Girls'
Participation

For advocates of women's sports and gender equality, the biggest
risk from degendering any sport is that it would diminish athletic oppor
tunities for girls. This could happen if girls are deterred by the prospect
of having to compete with and against boys. It could also happen if girls
are indeed unable to survive gender-free tryouts because they are, on the
whole, less competitive at the sport than boys are. Even though Emily
Nash has proven that female golfers can compete with and win against
boys, this is a valid and understandable concern, as it is the reason for
the separate-but-equal approach in the first place. 201 Yet, this risk must
be properly contextualized. As noted above, an overwhelming majority
of Massachusetts high schools sponsor only a boys' team, which means
that most schools with golf teams already expect any girls who want to
compete to surmount any disinterest in playing with or against boys, and
to earn a position on the team. 202 The remaining minority of schools that

199 Id.
200

The fact that most Massachusetts sports that are organized separately for girls and boys are
generally scheduled to the same season limits the potential for a wider analysis involving additional
examples of disadvantageous scheduling of seasons. Girls' volleyball is a fall sport and boys' vol
leyball is a spring sport, yet both of these seasons coincide with the traditional and collegiate seasons
for their respective sports. As such, it is unlikely that volleyball scheduling would provide any
evidence of disadvantageous scheduling affecting boys to offset the disadvantageous scheduling of
girls' golf.
201 See supra note 167; Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 295.
202 MlAA PARTICIPATION SURVEY, supra note 155.
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offer teams for girls do so in the spring season. 203 Because gender-free
golf could be played in the fall, it would remove the practical disad
vantages that female golfers on girls' teams must overcome, as well as
the stigmatizing impact of imposing these disadvantages on female rather
than male golfers. The degendering of golf could have a net positive
effect on girls' participation, based on these considerations alone.
In addition, however, there are two attributes of golf when played
as a team sport that, if exploited, could make it particularly accommo
dating of female golfers on gender-free teams. One feature of team golf
is that, unlike other team sports, there is no inherently ideal roster size.
Other team sports have a set number of players who can compete at a
time-nine in baseball, six in hockey, for example. While this number
does not cap the size of the team, it serves to anchor what is generally
considered an appropriate number. Rosters in those sports are therefore
relatively similar in size from school to school. In team golf, however,
there is great diversity in the size of teams throughout the Common
wealth. The fact that some schools have golf teams of twenty, suggests
that schools with teams of only four or five could probably expand in
size to accommodate more players without diminishing the opportunities
of existing players. 204 Such expansion would mean that degendering golf
doesn't necessarily require all female golfers to displace an existing male
golfer in order to make the team.

The second feature of team golf that could make it more accommo
dating of female golfers is that there is no paradigmatic format for team
golf. Unlike baseball, for example, which is consistently played the same
way, team golf is played in a variety of ways already, even within the
Commonwealth. While it would be impossible to imagine changes to the
rules of baseball that would maximize participation by athletes whose
skills are not already selected for by the rules of the game-such changes
would undermine essential aspects of the sport-team golf is not so re
stricted by such consistency and tradition. 205 Organizers therefore have
more leeway in team golf than in other sports to consider changes to the
format and the scoring that could maximize participation by golfers with
a diverse set of skills and abilities.

203 Rule 35 .1.1 of the MIAA HANDBOOK states that "[a] school may offer golf in either Fall or
Spring, but the Boys Team Tournament is held in the Fall and the Girls Team Tournament is held
in the Spring." MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 36.
204 For instance, Agawam High School has eighteen boys and three girls playing golf, Amesbury
High School has eighteen boys playing golf, and Bellingham High School has twenty-one boys and
one girl playing golf. MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2018-19 SPORTS PARTICIPATION
BY SCHOOL 4-5, 17 (May 10, 2019), http://www.miaa.net/gen/miaa generated bin/docu
ments/basic_module/MemberSchoo!Participation20182019. pdf [https: //perma:-cc/L9WY-957K].
205 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (holding that permitting a golfer to
use a golf cart-despite the association's walking requirement-"would not fundamentally alter the
nature of petitioner's tournaments.").
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Individual golf, to be sure, has traditionally and is consistently
played in the same way: "using clubs to cause a ball to progress from the
teeing ground to a hole some distance away with as few strokes as pos
sible. "206 An individual golfer therefore needs a combination of skills:
strength to drive the ball from the tee to the green and the finesse to put
the green. Some of the formats for team golf are inherently based on
stroke play, so that a round of golf played by all members of both teams
can simultaneously determine a team winner and an individual winner.
For example, sometimes teams square off in matched pairs and the team
with the highest number of pair-wins is the match winner. In another
team format, after all players on both teams have played the entire
course, the team is awarded one point for having the player with the
lowest score on the first nine holes, one point for having the player with
the lowest score on the last nine holes, and one point for having the player
with the lowest score overall; the team with the highest number of points
wins the match.
With so much inherent diversity already in the sport of team golf,
rules of team play could creatively seek to recognize a wider range of
skills that might be present on an all-gender team. For example, after all
players on both teams have played all 18 holes, the team winner could
be determined by series of points awarded for the player who uses the
fewest strokes to reach the green from the tee, the player who uses the
fewest strokes from the green to the hole, and the player with the lowest
score overall. This is only a slight modification from the team golf format
that awards one point for each of the front-nine winner, back-nine win
ner, and overall winner. But it would permit a player with less physical
strength, who might need two strokes to reach the green, a chance to
contribute to the team's overall score of the match. A good short-game
player would therefore be more valuable to the roster even if they don't
drive the ball as far as the other players on the team. A coach putting
together a team would take this into account when deciding who can play,
with the result being a more physically-diverse team that naturally is
more gender diverse as well.

V.

CONCLUSION

On its face, Attorney General v. MIAA secures a limited right of
boys to play on girls' teams. 207 But more fundamentally, it is a decision
that rejects the knee-jerk unqualified protectionism that justifies the seg
regation of sports by sex. Arguably, it is a case that should have inspired
206
1fJ7

Id. at 683.
393 N.E.2d at 288-90.
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more creative alternatives to segregation than it has in fact. On the occa
sion of the decision's fortieth anniversary, it makes sense to reconsider
the paradigm of segregation in sport.
This article contributes a modest and practical proposal that accepts
the invitation extended by the Supreme Judicial Court forty years ago to
ensure that segregation is tailored as narrowly as possible to secure pro
tection of girls' athletic opportunities. Without abandoning segregation
altogether, it is possible to start to examine it critically and seek to scale
it back where possible. Golf represents one concrete example of a sport
in which girls may have more to gain than lose by removing the segre
gation in that sport. More fundamentally, the process of examination that
is reflected in Part IV can serve as a model for continuing to examine all
sports over time.
Gender-free sports, whether golf or something else, are important
to include among the options for high school athletes for three important
reasons: first, they mitigate the stigma inherent in the protectionisms that
female athletes are categorically inferior. Emily Nash prevailed with the
lowest score in the boys' tournament and without any accommodation.
But it was only because her school decided to only field a boys' golf team
that she was competing in the fall tournament against male competitors. 208
There could be more people like Emily Nash out there; we just don't see
them because the majority of female golfers compete separately, in the
spring, and only against each other. Gender-free golf would provide
more opportunities for female athletes, their male teammates, and society
at large to recognize female athleticism as athleticism, unqualified. Sec
ond, gender-free sports can equalize access to resources, such as in the
case of golf: it is difficult for high schools to find golf courses to schedule
practice and competitions for separate teams in the same season, and girls
are relegated to the less advantageous spring season. Unification of two
separate teams would have the practical benefit of equalizing access to
resources at the most advantageous time. Finally, gender-free golf would
provide more opportunities for athletes to participate without scrutiny of
their sex and gender. This could be particularly advantageous to athletes
who are trans gender, including those who are non-binary. Transgender
athletes, especially transgender female athletes, often face public scrutiny
and criticism when participating in girls' sports. 209 Gender-free options
provide transgender athletes the opportunity to avoid this risk while still
participating in athletics. Athletes who identify as other than male or fe
male may also face similar scrutiny when participating in gendered
sports. In addition, however, whereas other transgender athletes have the
opportunity to select gendered sports that validate their gender identities,
a non-binary athlete's opportunity for gender-validating participation is
208
209

Auclair, supra note 171.
See generally Barnes, supra note 144.
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currently limited but would be enhanced by the addition of more gender
free opportunities.
For all these reasons, educators in Massachusetts should adhere to
the forty-year old directive in Attorney General v. MIAA to ensure that
segregation is narrowly tailored to its protectionist objective and should
strive to degender sports wherever it makes sense to do so.

